Review of Some of Bruce Whittlesea’s Work
Although, I’m not going to be quoting or referencing in this article as much as I will putting forward others’ ideas as my own; I will say that much of this posting comes from reading four articles from Whittlesea et. al. ranging from 1987-1994.
The debates and experiments designed to test hypotheses about the semantics of the use of the word “memory” have gone so far down the road of specificity of retrieval that it doesn’t even make sense anymore. Cognitive scientists want to have some sort of taxonomy of tasks and results, which are very difficult to explain in ordinary language, and sometimes impossible to link to a benefit to everyday life. When I read about his five different constraints he was putting in, and then added about three other variables (1), I just wondered how much further we had to go with these experiments. Do we need to come up with a new Journal of Nanopsychology?
A lot of the tasks in these experiments fall under the usual criticism of not being normal enough. Another criticism I have is that there is only one reference to real world application, and it does feel really hypocritical to say that. Not in the sense that I wonder if my research has no application to society, but I really don’t like to hear people make that criticism. It seems that that person is being naïve and lazy for not understanding the article properly from the scientist’s point of view. However, the only time I remember the authors mentioning real world application of their conclusion is that dermatologists will make fewer misdiagnoses, if they are aware that their performance will be negatively affected due to similarity of the target to cases previously seen in the same time frame. This effect can be found up to two weeks after training.
On a more specific note, I didn’t like his explanation of Type II-0, which he calls a puzzling anomalous data point (II-0 = I-1). In experiment 1 those stimuli did not follow the I-1 > II-0 = II-2 > III-1 pattern, and he explained that II-0 was experienced in integral and analytic training. Subjects in the class-label cue condition, accessing analytical knowledge on most stimuli, recognized the familiar string of letters and classified them, reference “holistically-coded representation” of the trading items. Ready for the more complex hypothesis? Not only was the typicality of each letter of each training stimulus encoded for its category, but also was the analytic information in relation to each other letter of the stimulus. Participants are experiencing the fruits of analysis embedded within the code of a particular item in the task. This is the weakest part of his paper, and although there is no apparent alternative, his explanation seems off the mark.
Comments: rbecker58@msn.com
Footnotes
(1) Factors affecting the decision of the participant to use analytic knowledge or whole object knowledge to each task: 1. Exp. 1) Task focus: Individual Events vs. experience of the categories. 2. Exp. 2) Physical arrangement of the stimuli. 3. Exp. 3) Sequence of items and category labels. 4. Exp. 4) Processing available by concomitant tasks. 5. Exp. 5) Familiarity of the cues offered. Other constraints: Demands for speed and accuracy of performance, previous specific experience dealing with similar members in only one way, and complexity/simplicity of the structure of the domain.


